State v. Ryan Wesley Kuhs, 2010 WL 624016__ Ariz. __, __ P.3d __ (February 24, 2010)(ABUSE OF DISCRETION REVIEW; DEATH PENALTY UPHELD)
PROCEDURAL POSTURE:
Kuhs was convicted of one count of first degree burglary and one count of first
degree murder for the stabbing death of a man with whom he had previously
argued, and a jury sentenced him to death.
This is his automatic appeal following his death sentence.
Because the murder occurred after August 1, 2002, the Supreme Court
conducted an abuse of discretion review of his death sentence.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
(F)(2) PRIOR CONVICTION OF A SERIOUS OFFENSE – UPHELD
The jury found that Kuhs was convicted of the offense
of first degree burglary in this matter, and convicted for second degree
burglary in a previous case. Kuhs
did not contest this aggravating circumstance at trial.
(F)(6)ESPECIALLY HEINOUS, CRUEL OR DEPRAVED – UPHELD
Especially cruel:
The court found the jury did not abuse its discretion in finding that the
murder was especially cruel. The
victim suffered significant pain before his death.
He was stabbed several times, and ultimately died by bleeding to death
while choking on his own blood. The
victim had ample opportunity to feel pain and to contemplate his own impending
death. After a final stab wound to
his head, the victim was not immediately unconscious, but lay unable to move in
a pool of his own blood. Kuhs left
the victim alive and dying, and took no action to alleviate his suffering.
(F)(7)(a) OFFENSE COMMITED WHILE ON RELEASE – UPHELD
The jury found that Kuhs committed the murder while
on release from prison. Kuhs did not
contest this aggravating circumstance at trial.
(F)(7)(b) OFFENSE COMMITTED WHILE ON PROBATION – UPHELD
The jury found that Kuhs committed the murder while
on probation for a prior felony.
Kuhs did not contest this aggravating circumstance at trial.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
The Court found the
mitigation evidence was not compelling.
Kuhs’ purported mental disorder was linked to the crime only in that it
might have made him more impulsive.
Kuhs’ childhood was not so abusive that it mitigates his actions in killing the
victim. Moreover, Kuhs possesses
average to above average intelligence.
Thus, the jury did not abuse its discretion in not finding the mitigation
sufficiently substantial to call for leniency and rendering a death verdict.
JUDGMENT Death sentence affirmed.
State v. (Joshua Idlefonso)
Villalobos, 225 Ariz. 74, 235 P.3d 227 (2010) (DEATH PENALTY
UPHELD)
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Villalobos was
convicted of first degree murder and child abuse in the beating death of his
girlfriend’s five-year-old daughter. After finding three aggravating
circumstances, F6 (especially heinous, cruel or depraved), F7 (offense committed
while on release), and F9 (victim under age 15), and concluding that any
mitigating circumstances were not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency,
the jury returned a death verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions
and death sentence. This is Villalobos’s direct appeal.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
(F)(6) (ESPECIALLY HEINOUS, CRUEL OR DEPRAVED) –
UPHELD
The State presented substantial evidence that the victim suffered and that
Villalobos knew or should have known she was suffering, supporting the cruelty
prong of this aggravator. Villalobos admitted that he beat the victim and she
remained conscious. The medical examiner also testified that the victim was
conscious after she was punched and would have been in pain comparable to that
from a ruptured appendix. Ample evidence also supported the jury’s separate
finding that the murder was especially heinous or depraved based on its
conclusion that the murder was senseless, the victim was helpless, and
Villalobos had a caregiver relationship with the victim.
(F)(7) (MURDER COMMITTED WHILE ON RELEASE) – UPHELD
The State introduced uncontroverted evidence that Villalobos was on authorized
release from prison for federal and state drug charges at the time of the
offense.
(F)(9) (VICTIM UNDER AGE 15)
The State introduced uncontroverted evidence that Villalobos was twenty-one when
he murdered the victim, who was five.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
Villalobos presented four general categories of mitigation evidence: prior
abuse, mental health, good behavior, and remorse. The Court stated that even
assuming that Villalobos met his burden of establishing all claimed mitigation
evidence by a preponderance of the evidence, it could not conclude that the jury
abused its discretion in determining that the mitigating circumstances, taken as
a whole, were not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.
JUDGMENT: Convictions and death sentences affirmed.
State v. (Derek Don) Chappell,
__ Ariz. __, __ P.3d __ (August 3, 2010) (DEATH PENALTY UPHELD)
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Chappell
drowned his girlfriend’s two year-old son, Devon Shackleford, in the apartment
complex’s swimming pool. The jury convicted him of first degree murder and a
prior incident of child abuse, found three aggravators (F2 (the child abuse
conviction), F6 (especially cruel), and F9 (victim under age 15)), and
determined that he should be sentenced to death. This is Chappell’s automatic
appeal following that death sentence. Because the murder occurred after August
1, 2002, the Court reviewed for abuse of discretion the jury’s aggravation
findings and death sentence. A.R.S. § 13-756(A).
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
(F)(2) (PRIOR SERIOUS OFFENSE) - UPHELD
Chappell did not contest that this aggravator was established by the jury’s
guilty verdict on the child abuse charge.
(F)(6) (ESPECIALLY HEINOUS, CRUEL OR DEPRAVED) – UPHELD
Cruelty – The medical examiner’s testimony supported a finding that Devon
consciously experienced mental anguish before his death and Chappell knew or
should have known that Devon would suffer. Chappell told reporters during a
post-arrest press conference that Devon had struggled while in the pool and he
remembered Devon “looking at [him] straight in the eyes as he was in the water.”
The Court noted that “extreme” mental anguish is not required to establish this
aggravator, and the mere fact that Devon was two years old, and possibly did not
comprehend he was dying, did not prevent the jury from finding that he
consciously experienced mental anguish before his death.
(F)(9)) (AGE OF VICTIM) – UPHELD
This aggravator was established by the jury’s explicit finding during the guilt
phase that Devon was under the age of fifteen when he died.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
Chappell offered evidence of the following mitigating factors: (1) age; (2)
impaired ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct; (3) lack of
previous criminal history; (4) past good conduct and character; (5) commission
of the offense was out of character; (6) educational accomplishments; (7) good
behavior during pre-trial incarceration; (8) love for and by his family; (9)
good conduct during trial; (10) remorse; (11) existence of an uncharged
co-perpetrator (Shackleford); (12) cooperation with authorities; (13) good
prospect of rehabilitation; (14) religious commitment and belief; (15)
alcoholism; (16) impulsivity under stress; (17) mental health symptoms; (18)
bipolar disorder; (19) attention deficit hyperactivity disorder; (20) unusual
stress at or near the time of the incident; and (21) family history of mental
illness. The Court held that although Chappell presented a significant amount of
mitigation evidence, in light of the nature and strength of the three
aggravators, it could not conclude that the jury abused its discretion in
determining that the mitigation was not sufficiently substantial to warrant
leniency.
JUDGMENT: Convictions and death
sentence affirmed.
State v. (Leroy D.) Cropper,
223 Ariz. 522, 225 P.3d 579 (2010) (DEATH PENALTY UPHELD)
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Cropper pled
guilty to first degree murder in 1999 for the 1997 killing of an Arizona
Department of Corrections officer, and was sentenced to death by a superior
court judge. His conviction was affirmed on automatic appeal, see 205 Ariz. 181,
68 P.3d 407 (2003), but the death sentence was vacated and the matter remanded
for resentencing before a jury pursuant to Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
On remand, a jury found two aggravating factors: Cropper had a prior serious
conviction and he committed the murder while incarcerated. However, the jury
could not reach a verdict as to whether the killing was especially cruel, or
whether death was the appropriate sentence. A second jury was impaneled, and
found that the murder was committed in an especially cruel manner and that death
was the appropriate punishment. This is Cropper’s automatic appeal following
that death sentence.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
(F)(2) (PRIOR SERIOUS OFFENSE) - UPHELD
Cropper did not contest that he had been previously convicted of aggravated
assault, a serious offense.
(F)(6) (ESPECIALLY HEINOUS, CRUEL OR DEPRAVED) – UPHELD
Cruelty – The evidence demonstrated that Cropper sought out a violent
confrontation. The struggle lasted up to two minutes, he acknowledged. Further,
the medical testimony regarding the victim’s wounds and blood loss demonstrates
that the officer suffered physical pain. The medical examiner explained that the
wounds inflicted would have been particularly painful because of the “higher
concentration of nerves” in the neck; the officer would have felt a “stinging,
burning kind of pain.” The officer bled to death as a result of a number of
penetrating injuries to his thyroid gland, the jugular vein, and his chest
cavity and lung. Thus, it would have taken minutes for him to lose consciousness
because the time it would have taken to lose consciousness was the time it took
him to bleed out. Thus, the facts established beyond a reasonable doubt that the
officer consciously suffered physical pain and Cropper knew or should have known
he would experience such pain.
(F)(7)(a) (IN CUSTODY/ON RELEASE AT TIME OF OFFENSE) – UPHELD
Cropper did not contest the fact that he committed the murder of the prison
guard while he was in the custody of the Arizona DOC.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
Abusive childhood - The Court found Cropper had established this mitigator by a
preponderance of the evidence because testimony detailed that both his father
and stepmother abused him. However, it determined that childhood troubles
deserve less weight in mitigation because Cropper was 33 years old when he
committed the murder.
Remorse – The Court found Cropper’s expression of remorse in allocution, and
testimony by witnesses that he had changed while in prison to be sufficient to
establish this mitigator. However, the Court accorded it less weight based on
the State’s strong rebuttal evidence that Cropper threatened penal personnel and
wrote letters mocking them and bragging about the murder, continued to have
disciplinary problems and act violently, and assaulted another inmate after the
murder.
JUDGMENT: Conviction and death
sentence affirmed.
State v. (Alfredo Lucero) Garcia,
224 Ariz. 1, 226 P.3d 370 (2010) (DEATH PENALTY UPHELD)
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Garcia and
Sheffield shot and killed a bar owner during a robbery. They were each charged
with first degree murder and armed robbery. Their cases were severed for trial.
A jury found Garcia guilty of both counts. Following a mistrial, a new jury
found two aggravators, (F)(2) serious offense and (F)(5) pecuniary gain, and
decided Garcia should be sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the
convictions and death sentence. This is Garcia’s direct appeal.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
(F)(2) (PRIOR CONVICTION OF SERIOUS OFFENSE) – UPHELD
The State proved this aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt by introducing
documents reflecting Garcia’s prior convictions for sexual assault and armed
robbery.
(F)(5) (PECUNIARY GAIN) – UPHELD
When the killing and robbery happen almost simultaneously, the Court will not
attempt to divine the evolution of the defendant’s motive in order to discern
when, or if, his reason for harming the victim shifted from pecuniary gain to
some other speculative nonpecuniary drive. Considered in its totality, the
evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that Garcia’s participation in
the murder was motivated by the expectation of pecuniary gain, even if assuming
that Sheffield rather than Garcia shot the victim.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
(G)(3) (MINOR PARTICIPANT)
Garcia failed to establish this statutory mitigator because circumstantial
evidence established that he was actively involved in the murder.
NON-STATUTORY MITIGATION
The Court found the following non-statutory mitigating factors established by a
preponderance of the evidence: sentencing disparity (Sheffield received a life
sentence), drug addiction, dysfunctional childhood, and lack of future
dangerousness. All of these were accorded minimal weight. The Court also
rejected remorse as mitigation because Garcia has consistently denied
involvement in the murder.
JUDGMENT: Convictions and death
sentence affirmed.
State v. (Aaron Brian) Gunches,
225 Ariz. 22, 234 P.3d 590 (2010) (DEATH PENALTY VACATED)
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: In November
2002, Gunches and a female friend drove the victim to an isolated desert area,
where Gunches shot the victim four times. In October 2003, he was indicted for
first degree murder and kidnapping. He was found competent to stand trial in
November 2005 and competent to waive his right to counsel in November 2007. He
subsequently pleaded guilty to both counts and stipulated during the aggravation
phase that he had previously been convicted of a serious offense (F2). The jury
also found that the murder was committed in an especially heinous or depraved
manner (F6). Gunches presented virtually no mitigation evidence during the
penalty phase, but requested leniency in allocution. The jury returned a death
verdict. This is Gunches’s automatic appeal following that death sentence.
Because the murder occurred after August 1, 2002, the Court reviewed for abuse
of discretion the jury’s aggravation findings and death sentence. A.R.S. §
13-756(A).
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
(F)(2) (PRIOR SERIOUS OFFENSE) - UPHELD
Gunches stipulated during the aggravation phase that he had previously been
convicted of attempted murder, a serious offense.
(F)(6) (ESPECIALLY HEINOUS, CRUEL OR DEPRAVED) – REVERSED
Heinousness/Depravity - The Court reviewed the evidence supporting the jury’s
aggravation finding of heinousness and depravity, which was based on the
gratuitous violence factor. The medical examiner testified that each of the four
wounds ultimately would have been fatal. Gunches fired the shots from several
feet away and in rapid succession. The Court found that although there was
substantial evidence that Gunches inflicted more violence than was necessary to
kill, the record did not support the finding that he knew or should have known
that he had fired the fatal shot and yet continued to inflict violence.
JUDGMENT: Convictions affirmed; death sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing.
State v. (Gary Wayne) Snelling,
__ Ariz. __, 236 P.3d 409 (August 9, 2010) (DEATH PENALTY VACATED)
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Adele Curtis
was strangled in 1996 in a townhouse she owned but was showing to prospective
tenants. The murder remained unsolved until 2003 when DNA obtained from the
scene matched Snelling’s profile. In addition, Snelling’s prints matched the
prints found at the townhouse, and he had lived in the same complex as Curtis at
the time of the murder. The jury found Snelling guilty of first degree murder
and that the murder was committed in an especially cruel manner (F6). However,
it could not reach unanimous agreement concerning whether the murder was
committed for pecuniary gain and also hung on the appropriate penalty. A second
jury was impaneled to determine the penalty and sentenced Snelling to death.
This is Snelling’s automatic appeal following that death sentence. Because the
murder occurred after August 1, 2002, the Court reviewed for abuse of discretion
the jury’s aggravation findings and death sentence. A.R.S. § 13-756(A).
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE:
(F)(6) (ESPECIALLY HEINOUS, CRUEL OR DEPRAVED) –
REVERSED
Cruelty - The Court found that cruelty had not been established beyond a
reasonable doubt. The record showed only that the victim was suddenly confronted
by an assailant who promptly strangled her to death and therefore, she did not
contemplate her fate for very long. The State also presented no evidence of
physical suffering because even if the victim was conscious for some time during
the strangulation, that alone does not support a finding of physical pain.
Because the Court on independent review found the evidence insufficient evidence
to support the sole aggravator, it did not consider Snelling’s mitigation
evidence and reduced the death penalty to natural life in prison.
JUDGMENT: Conviction affirmed; death sentence vacated and natural life sentence imposed.